See my note about strategies in the introduction
.
Definition:
A voter can vote for as many alternatives as he or she wishes. The alternative that receives the most votes wins. There is no justification for entering a ballot approving of all alternatives or disaproving of all alternatives. Although ballots that do not do this may or may not be considered spoiled, I do not consider them for the purposes of this site.
Strategy:
Definition:
Each alternative is given a score (for example from 0 to 100) by each voter. The alternatives with the highest total score wins. There is no justification for not giving the lowest score to the least favourite candidate, and the highest score to the most favourite. Although ballots that do not do this may or may not be considered spoiled, I do not consider them for the purposes of this site.
Strategy:
Definition:
Choose the Condorcet winner if one exists. Otherwise, find the Borda winner.
Strategy:
compromising, teaming, crowding
Definition:
For each ballot, each alternative is given one point for every other alternative it is ranked above, and 1/2 point for every other alternative it is ranked as equal to. The alternative with the highest total score wins. This score is often called the Borda Count.
Strategy:
teaming, crowding, burying, compromising
Name: Borda-Elimination
Nanson's Modified Method
Baldwin
Nanson
Definition:
The alternative with the lowest Borda count is eliminated. This is repeated until only one alternative is left.
Strategy:
push-over, burying, compromising, crowding, vote-splitting
Definition:
Candidates are given points based on the rank ballots of the voters. At every stage, if any candidates has a number of points greater than half the number of voters, the candidate with the greatest number of points wins. Start by giving one point for each first preference vote, then add 1 for every second and so on until a winner can be declared.
Strategy:
burying, compromising, crowding, teaming
Definition:
Start with no alternatives eliminated . If one candidate has a majority of first-place votes, it is the winner. Otherwise, find the total for each alternative of how many ballots it is the lowest ranked non-eliminated alternative. Eliminate the alternative with the highest score. Repeat the process until an alternative has a majority in first-place votes among non-eliminated candidates.
Strategy:
compromising, push-over, teaming,
Definition:
Each alternative's Copeland score is calculated by subtracting the number of alternatives that pairwise beat it from the number that it beats. The alternatives with the highest Copeland score win.
Strategy:
burying, compromising, crowding
Definition:
Each alternative is given a score equal to the smallest number of swaps in adjacent preferences necessary to make it the Condorcet Winner. The alternative with the lowest score wins.
Strategy:
compromising, burying, teaming, crowding
Name: IRV
Instant Run-off Voting (IRV)
Majority Preference Voting (MPV)
Alternative Vote (AV)
Single Transferable Ballot
Plurality-Elimination
Definition:
Start with no alternatives eliminated . Find the total for each alternative of how many ballots it is the highest ranked non-eliminated alternative. Eliminate the alternative with the lowest score. Repeat the process until only one alternative is left.
Strategy:
Name: Kemeny-Young Maximum Likelihood Method
Definition:
Each possible complete ranking of the candidates is given a "distance" score. For each pair of candidates, find the number of ballots that order them the the opposite way as the given ranking. The distance is the sum across all such pairs. The ranking with the least distance wins.
Strategy:
compromising, burying, crowding
Each alternative is given a score (for example from 0 to 100) by each voter. The alternative with the highest median score wins. There is no justification for not giving the lowest score to the least favourite candidate, and the highest score to the most favourite. Although ballots that do not do this may or may not be considered spoiled, I do not consider them for the purposes of this site.
Strategy:
Definition:
Each alternative is given a score equal to the greatest margin of victory by which that alternative loses a pairwise contest. A score of 0 is given if no losses exist for the candidate. The alternative with the lowest score wins.
Strategy:
compromising, burying, vote-splitting
Name: Nanson (original)
Nanson's Original Method
Nanson
Definition:
All alternatives whose Borda counts are equal to or below the average Borda count for the alternatives are eliminated. This is repeated until only one alternative remains.
Strategy:
push-over, burying, compromising, crowding, vote-splitting
Definition:
Repeatedly eliminate the alternative with the highest score in Minmax.
Strategy:
push-over, compromising, burying
Name: Plurality
First Past the Post (FPP)
Definition:
Each voter votes for only one alternative. The alternative with the most
votes wins.
Strategy:
compromising,
vote-splitting
Definition:
Choose one of the alternatives at random with each having an equal chance of winning.
Strategy:
Definition:
Choose one ballot at random. If the ballot does not rank a candidate with respect to another, and this ranking is desired, choose another ballot. If no ballot ranks a set of candidates with respect to each other, ranking can be decided randomly.
Strategy:
None.
Name: Ranked Pairs
Tideman's method
Definition:
Ranked Pairs finds a complete ranking. pairwise victories are processed starting from the greatest margin, and working down. These victories are locked, which means that the final ranking will agree with this pairwise decision. If a victory is processed that is incompatible with the previously locked victories, it is skipped. Once all victories are processed, a complete ranking is left.
Strategy:
Definition:
If for a pairwise contest X either beats or ties Y, then we say that X has a path to Y, with a strength equal to the number of voters ranking X over Y.
If X has a path to Y of strength m, and Y has a path to Z of strength n, then we say that X has a path to Z equal to the minimum of m and n.
Of all the paths from X to Y, a maximum path strength can be found. If the maximum path strength from X to Y is greater than the maximum path strength from Y to X, then Y cannot win. The winner is the candidate that does not lose any such maximum path strength comparisons.
Strategy:
Definition:
All members of the Smith set are winners. Usually combined with another method.
Strategy:
Definition:
First eliminate all alternatives who are not in the Smith set. Then find the Condorcet winner for the remaining alternatives based on Minmax.
Strategy:
compromising, burying, vote-splitting
Definition:
Each alternative is given a score equal to the sum of all its margins of defeat in pairwise contests against other alternatives. Its margins of victory do not affect its score. The alternative with the lowest score wins.
Strategy:
compromising, burying, crowding, vote-splitting
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